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Tierna is a sovereign State with a lengthy history.  Despite
occupation by its northern neighbor, Albilion’s leaders, since the
end of World War I, continuously sought to regain freedom.  On
or about September 3, 2006, Tierna reestablished its indepen-
dence.  Tierna was not a party to the Rome Statute in 2005
when the events that are the subject of this prosecution took
place.
While Tierna never took steps to ratify the Rome Statute by
2005, Albilion was opposed to the ICC when the criminal acts in
question occurred.  Despite Albilion’s initial ratification of the
the Rome Statute in 1999, Albilionese Prime Minister Eiling
announced unequivocally that he had resolved to “unsign” the
Statute in January 2003.
The unsigning of the Statute by Albilionese leadership was
consistent with the Prime Minister’s mandate after a victory in
national elections, during which he had been an outspoken op-
ponent of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”).
Although the record is silent as to whether explicit written noti-
fication of Albilion’s withdrawal was sent to the UN Secretary
General, Albilion led an extensive campaign to register its ob-
jection to ICC jurisdiction over its territory and citizens, barring
Albilionese consent.
The Albilionese government took numerous steps to regis-
ter its opposition to the ICC.  First, in March 2003, the Albilion-
ese Parliament passed the Albilionese Citizenry Protection Act
* J.D. University of Miami School of Law 2008.  B.A. New York University
2002.  This brief is dedicated to my mentor Professor Edgardo Rotman.  Without
Professor Rotman’s support, this brief would not have been possible.  In addition, I
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(“ACPA”), authorizing the use of military force to prompt the
release of Albilionese citizens or citizens of an Albilionese-allied
country being held by the ICC.  In addition, the ACPA provided
for the withdrawal of Albilionese military assistance from coun-
tries that had merely ratified the ICC treaty and constrained
Albilionese involvement in UN peacekeeping as an ultimatum
to the international community seeking immunity from prose-
cution by the ICC.
Even after demonstrating its willingness to use deadly
force to avoid submission to ICC jurisdiction, Albilionese leader-
ship went even further in order to avoid the possibility that its
citizens could be brought before the ICC despite the fact that
Albilion was no longer a party.  Albilion persistently sought
agreements with other countries in an attempt to bar the trans-
fer or surrender of Albilionese nationals to the ICC by utilizing
the controversial theory, most notably promoted by the United
States, that bilateral agreements create an exception to ICC
territorial jurisdiction under Rome Statute Article 98(2).  In fur-
therance of its clear objection to the ICC, Albilion also
threatened the withdrawal of aid for countries that would not
guarantee Albilionese immunity from ICC prosecution.
Albilion also notified the United Nations of its objections to
ICC jurisdiction.  Despite broad international opposition, Albi-
lionese representatives successfully applied multi-faceted per-
sistent pressure to the UN Security Council in support of
Resolution 2214.  This Resolution was loosely modeled after a
similar resolution, 1422, that limited jurisdiction over U.S. citi-
zens. Resolution 2214 exempted peacekeepers from ICC juris-
diction, an even greater blow to ICC jurisdiction than 1422,
which merely delayed prosecution.
The text of Resolution 2214, championed by Albilion in
2003, only applies to cases “involving current or former officials
or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome
Statute.” (emphasis added).
Over two years after Albilion’s repeated assertions of free-
dom from ICC jurisdiction, a criminal act of tragic proportions
took place in Albilion, claiming the lives of 6,666 people.  Rogue
actors unassociated with the legitimate Tiernan Republican
Army (“TRA”) members and policies perpetrated these acts of
murder, which were perhaps politically motivated.
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/13
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Accordingly, Tiernan Prime Minister Coogan, then the
leader of the TRA, immediately condemned the acts. Prime
Minister Coogan explicitly affirmed that the TRA considered its
conflict to be governed by the Geneva Convention rules of war,
thus expressly ruling out attacks like the one committed by the
rogue murderers. Subsequently, Coogan made a solemn prom-
ise to bring “these murderers to justice for their heinous and
cowardly attacks on the Albilionese people.”
The Albilion military then launched a campaign against
the Tiernan people to discover the identities of the perpetrators.
This included random interrogation and wrongful detention
without trial of Tiernan citizens as well as increased military
checkpoints throughout the Tiernan countryside. Moreover,
Amnesty World Wide reported numerous instances of abuse
and torture of detainees by Albilionese military personnel.
By contrast, Tierna consistently demonstrated its respect
for the Geneva Convention and international customary law
throughout the remainder of its conflict with Albilion, as the
record reflects no instances of any violations of the Geneva Con-
vention or international law by Tiernan leadership.
Tierna also has demonstrated a commitment to freedom
and a fair system.  Significantly, in May 2006, free elections
were held and a democratically elected leadership led by Prime
Minister Coogan was peacefully installed.  Tierna’s respect for
the Geneva Convention and demonstrated commitment to aid
Albilion citizens continued when Tierna established itself as an
independent state.  As an act of goodwill towards Albilion,
Prime Minister Coogan released all Albilionese soldiers in Tier-
nan custody to Albilion in order to aid the country in a time of
economic and political crises.
In July 2006, new elections were held resulting in Nathan-
iel Essex being reelected as Prime Minister of Albilion.  In an
effort to mend relationships with various members of the inter-
national community, Prime Minister Essex pressured parlia-
ment to rescind the ACPA as well as any agreements with other
countries not to surrender or transfer Albilionese nationals to
the ICC.  Nothing in the record, however, indicates that such a
rescission took place.  Even so, such a rescission solely suggests
that Albilion would no longer challenge the ability of the ICC to
assert jurisdiction over non-parties in limited circumstances,
3
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but there is no indication that Essex began proceedings to “re-
sign” the Rome Statute.
Several months after the Tiernan elections, on August 28,
2006, three Tiernan nationals and confirmed TRA members,
Henry Lynch, Thomas Dane, and Jackson Cray, were arrested
in Albilion by the Albilionese Constabulary for suspicion of in-
volvement in the Bloody Thursday bombings.  After six days of
interrogation Lynch, Dane, and Cray confessed to being the
masterminds of Bloody Thursday. Nothing in the record indi-
cates the factual basis for their arrest or whether these confes-
sions were coerced by abuse or torture.
On September 10, 2006, during a crisis that resulted in the
collapse of the Albilionese economy and much of its infrastruc-
ture, Prime Minister Essex referred the case against the ac-
cused to the ICC.
In February 2007, after an initial investigation, the ICC
Prosecutor charged the defendants with five crimes under Arti-
cles 7 and 8.  The record gives no indication that the Prosecutor
received authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber prior to the
investigation in accordance with Article 15(3).  Furthermore,
nothing in the record states that notice was given to Tierna
prior to the issuance of the charging document.
Subsequently, Tierna challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction over
the defendants based on the jurisdictional limits and comple-
mentarity principle imposed by Articles 17, 18, and 19.
PLEADINGS
A. Under Article 19, the ICC Lacks Jurisdiction Over the
Accused Because Albilion Effectively Withdrew from the
Rome Statute Prior to March 2005.
1. The ICC is a court of limited jurisdiction.
The text of the Rome Statute explicitly states that certain
preconditions must be met to grant the ICC jurisdiction, regard-
less of the circumstances.  When a State Party refers a case to
the ICC, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction unless one of the
following states is a party to the Rome Statute: The state in
whose territory the alleged crime was committed or the state of
the alleged offender’s nationality.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/13
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Such a limit is vital to the legitimacy of the ICC because it
is one of the few significant checks and balances on the power of
the Court.  The limit is also in accordance with long-standing
principles of international law that a State will not be subject to
restrictions of a treaty that it does not agree to.  Article 12 em-
phasizes in both Section One and Section Two that a State must
be a “party to this Statute” with respect to the crimes against
humanity listed in Article 5 for the ICC to assert jurisdiction.
Thus, the Statute repeatedly emphasizes the need for a
State party to be connected to the events in question either
through a nexus to the territory where the event took place or
the nationality of the accused.
2. The ICC lacks jurisdiction over conduct that falls
outside the temporal jurisdiction of the court.
Regardless of the current status of a State where the con-
duct in question occurs, the ICC may not assert jurisdiction ret-
roactively. Under Article 24’s rule of non-retroactivity ratione
personae, “[n]o person shall be criminally responsible under this
Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute.”
By logical implication, temporal jurisdiction does not extend to
parties who withdraw from the treaty once its one-year notice
provision has been met.
This interpretation is consistent with the Rome Statute’s
grant of withdrawal of status as a State party “one year after
the date of receipt of  . . . notification, unless the notification
specifies a later date.”
Such a temporal limitation is also consistent with similar
international law jurisprudence.  In Nahimana, for example,
the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (“ICTR”) made
it clear that events prior to the establishment of the tribunal in
1994 could not be considered other than in the limited context of
“continuing crimes” or merely as evidence of a crime within its
temporal jurisdiction.
Similarly, in the Lovelace case, the UN Human Rights
Committee held that alleged human rights violations that oc-
curred prior to the entry into force of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) were outside its
jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECHR”) in the Veeber case, stated that the ECHR is
5
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generally binding on each of the contracting parties only for
events that take place after the entry into force.
Here, the events in question consisted of a single event, one
that cannot reasonably be characterized as a continuing crime.
Certainly, there is nothing in the record that alleges that the
criminal activity began significantly earlier than the actual
attack.
Since Tierna never became a party to the Rome Statute, the
accused are not subject to ICC jurisdiction based on their na-
tionality.  If they are considered to be Albilionese citizens be-
cause of such status at the time of the crimes, the same
argument about Albilion’s lack of party status, made in Section
IV (3), supra, applies.  Consequently, the only way for the ICC
to assert jurisdiction is to establish that Albilion, the State
where the events occurred, was a State party in 2005.  This as-
sertion fails, however, because Albilion denounced the Statute
well over one year before the acts in question.
3. Albilion effectively denounced the Rome Statute as of
April 2003, nearly two years prior to the 2005
criminal activity.
The drafters of the Rome Statute clearly contemplated the
ability of a State Party to withdraw from the treaty without sig-
nificant obstacles.  Article 127(1) of the Statute provides: “[a]
State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Stat-
ute.  The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of
receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a
later date” (emphasis added).
The use of the word “may” rather than “shall” or “must”
strongly implies that the drafters did not intend for this to be
the exclusive method of withdrawal.  Such a provision also
sharply contrasts with the withdrawal provision of many trea-
ties, which require “significant change in circumstances” or of-
fer no withdrawal provision at all
Key concepts of customary international law are utilized by
States to guide their judgment in interpretation of international
agreements: pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus. The
most significant interpretive guideline, however, is codified by
the Vienna Convention, which states, “[a] treaty shall be inter-
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/13
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preted in ‘good faith’ in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.”  While it is true that the Vienna
Convention notes that “denunciation of an international agree-
ment . . . may take place only . . . in conformity with the agree-
ment,” the meaning of “conformity” must be viewed through the
lens of the treaty’s object and purpose.
Here, in light of the object and purpose of the Rome Stat-
ute, a good faith interpretation of Article 127 is that parties who
express their present intent to withdraw are no longer consid-
ered a State Party after a year, unless otherwise indicated.  Al-
bilion expressed a present intent to withdraw on or about April
2003, after its declaration to “unsign the treaty” and extensive,
well-documented legislative steps to denounce any ICC jurisdic-
tion over its citizens without an explicit waiver by Albilion.
While the record is silent as to whether explicit written no-
tice was sent, such notice to the Secretary General is strongly
implied by the circumstances and consistent with the Vienna
Convention principles of treaty interpretation.
Specifically, Albilion’s actions seem to be patterned closely
after those of the United States in its efforts to oppose the Rome
Statute.  Just as U.S. President Bush announced his decision in
May 2002 to “unsign” the Rome Statute, Albilion Prime Minis-
ter Eiling announced his decision to unsign the Statute in Janu-
ary 2003.  Just as the U.S. passed a law that conditioned
military and financial support on an agreement not to turn over
its citizens to the jurisdiction of the ICC, Albilion passed a
nearly identical Statute in March 2003. All of these acts are
consistent with those of a State that no longer wishes to be con-
sidered a Party to the Rome Statute.
Most significantly, in April 2003, Albilion sought the pas-
sage of UN Security Council Resolution 2214, a resolution
somewhat similar to an earlier resolution initiated by the
United States.  Although it is true that the U.S. never formally
ratified the Rome Statute as Albilion had, it seems clear that
Albilion was modeling its own opposition after that of the U.S.
After affirming its intent to unsign the Rome Statute, the
U.S., through its ambassador John Bolton, sent formal notice of
its intent to disavow its status as a party to the Statute with a
three-line letter to then- Secretary General Kofi Annan.  It
7
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 210 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 210 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR113.txt unknown Seq: 8 26-MAR-09 13:52
408 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:401
seems highly unlikely that Albilion, which adopted the U.S. pro-
cedural forms of opposition nearly without alteration, would fail
to similarly communicate a formal letter of withdrawal to the
Secretary General.
Even if, whether through design or inadvertence, such a
communication was not sent, Albilion’s intent to withdraw was
clearly expressed to the Secretary General.  Nearly two years
before the 2005 criminal activity, Albilion “pressure[d]” the UN
Security Council to pass a resolution that limits jurisdiction
over non-parties.
The text of Resolution 2214, as well as the record as a
whole, makes it clear that the only plausible interpretation of
Albilion’s actions in 2003 was an expressed intent to become a
non-party.  Resolution 2214 supports this by emphasizing that
“not all States are parties to the Rome Statute. . ., States not
Party to the Rome Statute will continue to fulfill their responsi-
bilities in their national jurisdictions in relation to interna-
tional crimes,” and reaffirming the principle of
complementarity. The text of the Resolution only applies to
cases “involving current or former officials or personnel from a
contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute” (emphasis
added).  There would be no reason for Albilion to champion such
a resolution if it remained a State Party, to which the Resolu-
tion would be irrelevant.  This interpretation is bolstered by
Amnesty International’s description of Albilion in April 2003 as
a State “which opposes the ICC.”
Thus, notice of its withdrawal was certainly expressed to
both the UN Secretary General and other signatories between
January and April of 2003.  Such a campaign surely involved
some form of written communication to the UN, which also
would satisfy the “written notification” portion of Article 127.
In the alternative, the text of resolution 2214 itself qualifies as
written notification.
Consequently, Albilion was no longer a State Party by April
2004, one year after it communicated its withdrawal. While the
Vienna Convention does not specifically address how to conform
to withdrawal provisions of a treaty, it does mention that a
party who signs a treaty is subject to ratification until it shall
have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.
By analogy, even though Albilion had ratified the treaty four
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/13
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years earlier, Albilion withdrew its party status under the
Rome Statute by making its intention clear in April 2003, when
it actively sought to avoid jurisdiction over its citizens.
4. Albilionese leadership’s words and actions sufficiently
indicate a desire to withdraw, consistent with the
parallel concept of persistent objection.
Honoring Albilion’s expressed intent to withdraw is also
consistent with parallel concepts of international law.  Since the
Rome Statute’s use of the word “may” in its withdrawal provi-
sion implies that there are other acceptable means to do so, the
boundaries of acceptable methods are defined by good faith in-
terpretation and customary law.  The most highly analogous
concept in customary law is that of persistent objection.  Persis-
tent objection to a customary law can take a variety of forms; its
statement of objection can be couched in a variety of ways or a
combination of words and actions, even if gently stated, can pre-
serve a State’s status as an objector.
By analogy, Albilion’s combination of words and actions in-
dicated its status as a party that had withdrawn from the Rome
Statute.  Certainly, allowing States a multiplicity of means to
withdraw from treaties creates a risk of ambiguity, but the nu-
merous and repeated indications by Albilion were more than
sufficient to meet such a standard.
5. Honoring the right of a State to denounce a treaty
obligation, in accordance with international law,
helps promote international cooperation.
While conventional wisdom might characterize treaty with-
drawal as a rare and momentous event, the facts suggest other-
wise.  An empirical study of all treaty obligations between 1945
and 2004 reveals that there were 1547 denunciations (approxi-
mately 4.8% of ratifications) total and 191 (3.5%) denunciations
of multilateral agreements.  Withdrawals are therefore a regu-
larized component of modern treaty practice.
Thus, honoring Albilion’s clear indication of intent to withdraw
will not result in a slippery slope of parties constantly leaving
treaties.  The relatively low rate of statistical withdrawal shows
that most countries prefer to allow treaties to remain in force as
a means of securing their best interests.  But when the duly
9
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elected representatives of a State express the desire to with-
draw, failure to empower this action actually discourages treaty
commitments for fear that such commitments can never be ad-
justed to meet the needs of a signatory State.
It is true that many of Albilion’s actions centered on objec-
tion to jurisdiction over peacekeepers.  But Albilion’s immediate
declaration to “unsign” the treaty, and the text of Resolution
2214 make it clear that, in context, Albilion was persistently
communicating its objection not only to jurisdiction over non-
parties, but to its status as a party to the Rome Statute.
Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by
a State that has jurisdiction over a case on the ground that it is
investigating or prosecuting the case.  Since Tierna is a State
with jurisdiction that is in the process of investigating the ac-
cused, discussed in detail supra, Tierna has standing to chal-
lenge ICC jurisdiction.
Since neither Tierna nor Albilion was a Party to the Rome
Statute at the time of the criminal activity, Tierna respectfully
requests that this Court refer the case to Tierna based on the
jurisdictional limits of Articles 12 and 19.
B. In Addition to a Lack of Jurisdiction Due to Albilion’s
Withdrawal, the Case Is Inadmissible Because Tierna Is
Willing and Able to Investigate and Prosecute the
Accused.
1. The ICC’s jurisdiction is governed by the principle of
complementarity and the burden of proof rests with
the Prosecution.
One of the major goals of the Rome Statute is to retain the
primacy of sovereign States as the preferred forum for criminal
prosecution.  Thus, the Preamble and Article 1 of the Rome
Statute each emphasize that the ICC is complementary to na-
tional criminal jurisdictions.  In contrast to earlier ad hoc tribu-
nals, such as the one for Rwanda, the ICC does not have
primacy over national systems.
The travaux pre´paratoires suggest that the ICC should only
be resorted to in exceptional cases.  In turn, Article 17 defini-
tively states that the Court shall determine that under investi-
gation by a State with jurisdiction is inadmissible “unless the
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/13
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State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investi-
gation or prosecution.”
According to one leading scholar, the burden of proof to
show an inability or unwillingness is on the Prosecutor, and
meeting this heavy burden in light of the complementarity prin-
ciple may “demand greater resources of the Prosecutor in pre-
paring the admissibility argument than proving the guilt of the
alleged perpetrator.”  This interpretation is consistent with Ar-
ticle 17(2)’s mandate to interpret the definition of willingness in
light of “the principles of due process recognized by interna-
tional law.”  Principles of due process in nearly all criminal jus-
tice systems place the burden of proof on the Prosecution.
2. Tierna is a State that has jurisdiction over a matter
that is being investigated or prosecuted by the State.
Tierna satisfies Article 17’s requirement that the case is
“being investigated or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction
over it.”  Tierna’s current status as a State is amply supported
by its history as a sovereign State, military victory over its oc-
cupiers, and its democratically elected leadership.  Since the ac-
cused are Tiernans, Tierna has jurisdiction based on the
nationality principle, long recognized by international law as a
valid basis.
While the record is somewhat lacking in detail, a good faith
interpretation of Article 17 also must hold that the accused are
“being investigated” by Tierna.  Tiernan Prime Minister Coo-
gan, immediately after the events in question, demonstrated his
commitment to such an investigation when he vowed to bring
these “murderers to justice.”  Tierna’s appearance before the
Court to assert jurisdiction is also strong circumstantial evi-
dence that the process of investigation has been ongoing.
Furthermore, in light of the content and purpose of the
Rome Statute, the Court should simply require indicators of a
commitment to investigate when the accused has been held in a
foreign jurisdiction or at the ICC.  When a country knows that
another jurisdiction holds the suspects in question, it inef-
ficiently allocates resources to require another willing jurisdic-
tion to investigate prior to receipt of the accused in order to
preserve its rights under Article 17.
11
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 212 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 212 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR113.txt unknown Seq: 12 26-MAR-09 13:52
412 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:401
3. Tierna is willing to genuinely investigate and
prosecute the matter.
Article 17(2) lists several factors to determine the meaning
of willingness.  The factors relating to unjustifiable delay and
impartial proceedings do not apply here because Tierna has yet
to have custody over the accused.  Therefore, the prosecution
has the burden to show that “[t]he proceedings were or are be-
ing undertaken or the national decision was made for the pur-
pose of shielding the person[s] concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes.”  In effect, Article 17(2) calls for an
evaluation of the good faith of national authorities.
To meet its burden, the Prosecution must do more than
make an unsubstantiated challenge to the good faith of a sover-
eign State, when Tierna actively seeks to prosecute individuals
for a crime, which its leadership has publicly condemned in un-
equivocal terms.  The Victim’s Advocates’ theory that the histor-
ical relationship between the Albilionese and Tiernans make a
fair trial impossible is mere speculation and unpersuasive.
Former status as an occupied State does not, by itself, elim-
inate a sovereign State’s ability to investigate and prosecute cit-
izens accused of heinous crimes during the period of occupation.
For example, in 2006, the Police Service of Northern Ireland es-
tablished a Historical Enquiries Team (“HET”) charged with in-
vestigating a total of 3,268 deaths that took place during the
period prior to a truce between the IRA and British authorities.
According to Peter Hain, Britain’s Secretary of State for North-
ern Ireland, it is “quite possible” that perpetrators will face
prison sentences as a result of the HET’s work.
If Tiernan leadership had considered the accused to be
POWs, it could easily have sought to free them in exchange for
the return of Albilionese soldiers prior to referral to the ICC.
The fact that Tierna followed the Geneva Convention protocol
without any preconditions suggests that Tierna seeks the op-
portunity to demonstrate its commitment to justice.
There are a number of good faith motives that are at least
as plausible as the illicit motives attributed to Tierna by the
opposing parties.  First, trial and conviction by a jury of Tiernan
peers will send a strong message that mass murder is intolera-
ble even to those whose name is used to justify such an act.  In
addition, judgment by a Tiernan court delegitimizes any at-
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/13
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 213 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 213 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR113.txt unknown Seq: 13 26-MAR-09 13:52
2009] “BEST BRIEF” DEFENSE 413
tempt by the accused for martyrdom, a goal that could be
reached if the ICC convicts them.  Finally, trial in a Tiernan
court may serve as a tool for reconciliation and truth seeking,
just as domestic trials paved the way for a peaceful transition in
post-apartheid South Africa.
4. Tierna is genuinely able to investigate and prosecute
the matter.
Freedom from occupation and democratic free elections
over the past eighteen months bolster Tierna’s ability to investi-
gate and prosecute the accused.  Despite the suggestion from
the victims’ advocate that Tierna’s “recovery” from the occupa-
tion meets the standard for inability; such an inference is both
unsupported by facts in the record and a misstatement of Rome
Statute standards.  Under Article 17(3), “the Court shall con-
sider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavaila-
bility of its national judicial system, the State is unable to
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”  The “heart of
inability” is a lack of control over the accused.
A case is inadmissible to the ICC unless there is a gap in
jurisdiction, typically caused by a collapse of judicial institu-
tions, widespread anarchy, or inability.  This situation is distin-
guishable from the present case.  Significantly, the burden is on
the Prosecution to demonstrate Tierna’s inability to prosecute,
and there is little or no evidence in the record that Tierna lacks
this fundamental ability.  While it is true that Prime Minister
Coogan released Albilionese soldiers to their native country,
such an act of political reconciliation is a sign of respect for in-
ternational law, rather than a lack of prosecutorial resources.
In point of fact, such an act demonstrates Tiernan leadership’s
continuing commitment to the Geneva Convention which man-
dates, “[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”
The mere fact that Tierna has been free from occupation for
over a year is insufficient evidence of an inability to prosecute.
Unlike the situation in Albilion, nothing in the record suggests
that Tierna lacks a judicial infrastructure.  Many countries
have demonstrated an ability to conduct trials in the aftermath
of occupation or civil war.  In Uganda, for example, an indepen-
13
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dent judicial system remained after a bloody armed conflict in
the North.  Even during the violent period of conflict between
Britain and the IRA, Northern Ireland’s courts, and the British
judicial system in general, produced convictions of criminal of-
fenders - especially those involved in paramilitary violence.
Therefore, the Victim’s Advocate’s theory that the “recovery”
from many years of occupation makes it impossible to “ade-
quately” try the accused lacks merit.
Tierna’s peaceful transition to a democratically elected gov-
ernment demonstrates its commitment to the rule of law.  The
Prosecution cannot meet either its burden to show that there
has been a substantial collapse of the judicial system in Tierna
or that it is currently unavailable. The current situation is dis-
tinguishable from the court’s assertion of admissibility over the
Uganda referral.  There, the Ugandan government had agreed
to grant amnesty over the accused and had little chance of gain-
ing custody over members of the accused who were being shel-
tered in Sudan.  By contrast, Tierna has no restrictions on its
ability to prosecute and can easily gain custody upon a grant of
its motion.
Furthermore, Tiernan officials are more likely than the
ICC to have the ability to obtain relevant evidence as a result of
both geographical proximity and access to TRA members who
may have had contact with the accused.
ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has empha-
sized publicly that “[a]s a consequence of complementarity . . .
the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the
regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major
success.”
Tierna fought for its sovereignty after nearly a century of
deprivation; it is simply bad policy for the ICC to seek to divest
Tierna of one of the essential rights as a sovereign State: to de-
termine the guilt or innocence of its accused and to be empow-
ered to demonstrate to the civilized world their commitment to
a fair and enlightened system of justice.
C. In Furtherance of Complementarity, the ICC Must Defer to
Tierna’s Investigation Under Article 18(2).
The Rome Statute clearly contemplates domestic investiga-
tion by a willing sovereign State with jurisdiction as the pre-
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/13
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ferred course of action over ICC investigation.  Article 18(1)
specifies that after a referral by a State Party (here, assuming
arguendo, Albilion had such a status in 2007), “the Prosecutor
shall notify  . . . those States which, taking into account the in-
formation available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over
the crimes concerned.”  The use of the plural “States” indicates
that this requirement extends to not only the State where the
crime occurred, but also to any State that typically would exer-
cise jurisdiction.
Tierna is a State that would normally exercise jurisdiction
under the nationality principle, as discussed infra.  Nothing in
the record indicates that the Office of the Prosecutor gave notice
to Tierna prior to the charging document.  Therefore, the charg-
ing document, in effect, served as notice.
Consequently, Tierna triggered Article 18(2) by indicating
their desire to investigate within one month of the public re-
lease of the charging document.  In such a situation, at the re-
quest of a State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State’s
investigation of those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on
the application of the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the
investigation.
The Statute is ambiguous as to what grounds would be ap-
propriate for the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize an investiga-
tion even where a State is willing to do so.  Applying the Vienna
Convention principles of context and purpose, the Pre-Trial
Chamber would not honor the principle of complementarity if it
failed to defer to Tierna, a State that would normally exercise
jurisdiction.
The ability of the Pre-Trial Chamber to reevaluate after six
months provides the safeguard against concerns about Tierna’s
motives.  In the unlikely event that doubts about Tierna’s will-
ingness and ability are supported by actual proof during the six
month period, a dismissal based solely on Articles 17 and 18
could be reversed.  The drafters set up such a system to ensure
that issues of complementarity would be based on facts derived
from a State’s actions during the six-month period of deference,
rather than mere speculation.
15
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Four years ago, Prime Minister Coogan made a solemn
promise to bring the “murderers to justice for their heinous and
cowardly attacks on the Albilionese people.”  Tierna respectfully
seeks the Court’s deference to Tiernan jurisdiction to honor that
promise in the context of an open and fair trial by a willing and
able State.
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/13
